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Abstract
Internet infrastructure is a key enabler of e-business. The infrastructure consists of backbone networks (such
as UUNET and AT&T), access networks (such as AOL and Earthlink), content delivery networks (CDNs,  such
as Akamai) and other caching service providers. Together, all of the players make up the digital supply chain
for information goods. Caches provisioned by CDNs and other entities are the storage centers, the digital
equivalent of warehouses. These caches store and deliver information from the edge of the network and serve
to stabilize and add efficiency to content delivery. While the benefits of caching to content providers with
regard to scaling content delivery globally, reducing bandwidth costs and response times are well recognized,
caching has not become pervasive. This is largely due to misaligned incentives in the delivery chain. Much of
the work done to date on Web caching has focused on the technology to provision quality of service and has
not dealt with issues of fundamental importance to the business of provisioning caching services, specifically,
the design of incentive compatible services, appropriate pricing schemes, and associated resource allocation
issues that arise in operating a caching service. We discuss the design of incentive compatible caching services
that we refer to as quality of service caching.  Pricing plays an important role in aligning the incentives. We
develop an analytic model to study the IAPs optimal pricing and capacity allocation policies.
1 INTRODUCTION
According to the Gartner Group, e-business will be a $4.4 trillion industry by 2003. Internet infrastructure is a key enabler of e-
business. The infrastructure consists of the following players intermediating between the end user and the content provider:
(1) Internet access providers (IAP), such as AOL and Earthlink, that provide retail-level Internet access to end users.
(2) Local area transport (LAT) service providers:  connecting the end users premises to the IAPs point of presence (POP). These
include dialup, DSL and cable modem service providers.
(3) Backbone networks such as AT&T and UUNET that own the Internet backbone and provide wholesalelevel Internet access
to IAPs. Backbones connect to each other through network access points (NAPs).
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Figure 1. The Internet Industry Structure
Figure 1 illustrates the interaction between the players in the Internet value chain. Content publishers such as Yahoo and CNN
typically connect to the backbone providers or host their content at data centers of the backbone providers. The end users obtain
access to the content through the access networks (IAPs). Due to the growing traffic and congestion on the network, latency (delay
in accessing content) and bandwidth costs tend to be high. Therefore, content delivery networks (CDNs, such as Akamai) and
other caching service providers (IAPs such as AOL) often store local copies of content at the edge of the network (typically IAP
servers) to minimize latency for the end users and bandwidth costs for IAPs and content providers.
Each player in the Internet value chain plays a distinct role. The networks are involved in providing transport services. They help
move the content, created by content providers, over the Internet. Caches are the storage centers, the digital equivalent of
warehouses. In this context, the Internet infrastructure makes up the digital supply chain for information goods. The content
provider creates the content, networks help move the content, and the caches store and deliver it to the users. Our study focuses
on caching because of the rapidly occurring transformation of these content storage and distribution centers and the critical impact
that these changes might have on the digital supply chain and, therefore, to e-business. This is underscored in IDCs projection
that the caching server appliance market would be worth $13 billion in 2004. In this paper, we focus on caching at IAP locations.
2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
A Web cache can be conceptualized as an intermediary that stores local copies of Web content between the origin server and the
client in order to satisfy future requests for the same (depicted in Figure 2). If data (a Webpage) is requested, the local copy is
returned instead of requesting it from the origin server. Cache performance is measured by its hit-rate, which denotes the fraction
of requests satisfied by the cache.
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Figure 2.  Caching Service as Intermediation
End users benefit from the latency reduction facilitated by caching. Caches also help the IAPs realize bandwidth savings as
content served from the cache need not be transported over the backbone. In addition, content publishers also derive significant
benefits. It reduces their bandwidth costs, as they do not have to deliver any data for requests satisfied from the cache. It also
reduces the load on their servers and thus their infrastructure costs. Caching helps reduce response time in content delivery.
According to Forrester Research, response time is a key determinant of consumer switching behavior on the Web and current
expectations are around four seconds for downloading Web pages (Nelson 2000). Furthermore, by meeting a large fraction of the
demand using locally stored content, it helps in handling flash crowds that are typical on the Internet. Flash crowd is the term used
to refer to sudden surges in demand for content and is often responsible for server crashes and downtime due to the overwhelming
activity levels. Content publishers do not currently pay for these caching services. 
While the benefits of caching to content providers are well recognized, there are several reasons why caching is not pervasive.
Principal among them is that caching results in loss of business intelligence regarding visits. Accuracy of access reports and click-
stream data is crucial to various firms for marketing and internal audits. Hence, cache busting (marking content as non-cacheable)
prevails among several content providers. Furthermore, a variety of e-marketing techniques rely on personalization through
cookies. Jupiter Research reported that 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies had migrated to dynamic data driven personalized
content as early as 1998. Traditional caching approaches have impeded personalization due to the possibility of content created
for one user being displayed to another. In addition, some publishers cache-bust due to concerns relating to stale content being
served to the end user. This occurs whenever changes in content at the origin server are not reflected at the cache. Finally, caching
may potentially create new security concerns (violation of confidentiality, integrity, or authentication). For example, several
publishers with confidential data such as medical records cache-bust due to security concerns arising from confidential data
residing in a foreign location that is not under their immediate control. 
Thus, there is a growing need to devise ways of gaining the benefits of caching without incurring the costs that precipitate cache
busting. Recent innovations in caching technology provide the means to address the aforementioned problems. For example,
dynamic content caching protocol (DCCP) (Smith et al. 1999) enables caching of dynamic content and thus facilitates
personalization. Servers can also send caches invalidation messages (Yu et al. 1999) whenever content changes to circumvent
problems associated with delivery of stale content. In addition, value added services such as differential caching, push caching,
prefetching, etc further enable publishers to derive tangible benefits. Differential caching entails differential treatment to different
data objects by reserving cache space or allocating a larger fraction of the cache space to high priority content (Kelly et al. 1999;
Myers et al. 2001). Push caching and prefetching allow a publishers content to be moved into the cache even before a request
is made (in anticipation of future requests).  Building on these developments, Chuang and Sirbu (1999) propose the stor-serv
framework and discuss the technical requirements and design issues associated with service specification and provisioning. The
bundling of content delivery, content targeting, and business intelligence with these value-added technologies will provide assured
quality of service (QoS) in Web caching. We refer to the bundle of these new technologies (represented in Table 1) as QoS
caching. 
The use of these technologies to deploy value-added services is expensive for IAPs (Maggs 2002; Stargate 2002) and hence needs
to be done in an incentive compatible fashion. Much of the work done to date on QoS in caching has focused on the technology
and has not dealt with issues of fundamental importance to the business of provisioning caching services, specifically, the design
of incentive compatible services, appropriate pricing schemes, and associated resource allocation issues that arise in operating
a caching service. This is the focus of the paper. 
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Table 1.  Best Effort Caching Versus Quality of Service Caching
QoS Dimension Best Effort Caching QoS Caching
1 Object Placement Pull (Traffic-Driven) Push, Prefetching
2 Object Replacement Least Recently Used (LRU), LFU Priority, Reservation
3 Object Consistency Expiration Headers (weak) Invalidation, Leases (strong)
4 Object Types Static Dynamic, Streaming
5 Business Intelligence Logging Reporting
6 Security No Yes
3 RELEVANT LITERATURE
The analytic model used in this paper is related to the models in Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bhargava et al. (2000).  Mussa and
Rosen consider the pricing of a product line by a monopoly, with buyers purchasing one good.  Bhargava et al. study pricing
strategies for intermediaries in electronic markets. Pricing of priority services has also been studied by others (Marchand 1974;
Mendelson and Whang 1990).  MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) provide an overview of pricing issues on the Internet. The
domain of Web caching poses unique challenges. First, the IAP also derives a positive utility from the caching service (bandwidth
cost reduction). Thus, there is a strong positive interaction between the IAPs surplus and the content providers surplus. This
unique feature raises new questions and leads to fresh insights. In addition, content providers subscribe to the service but the end
users, who do not participate in the subscription, generate the demand. In contrast, the aforementioned studies address pricing
when the subscriber controls the demand (typically unit demand). Furthermore, pricing and resource allocation are strongly
coupled in Web caching. The price that the IAP can charge depends partially on the hit rate it can provision, which is determined
by the allocation decision. The optimal allocation decision depends on the traffic profile in the various service classes, which is
in turn determined by the pricing.
QoS pricing has been addressed in detail in the network transmission domain. The reader is referred to Kaufmann and Walden
(2001) for an overview of the literature on network pricing. The performance objectives in transmission and caching are dissimilar.
In transmission, the goal is to reduce delay, jitter, or packet loss for applications that are sensitive to the same. It is also necessary
to provide network operators with incentives to provide appropriate service levels to users from different subscriber bases. Thus,
Gupta et al. (1997) and Cocchi et al. (1993) consider a pricing policy that maximizes social welfare rather than the network
operators profits. In caching, the QoS goal is to provide higher hit rates for objects that value caching more, providing security,
consistency, etc. Resources need not be allocated along the path from the content publisher to the end user as in transmission.
Allocation at the caching node alone suffices and this makes QoS caching easier to realize. Pricing provides the means to align
the incentives of IAPs and content provider and thus achieve the QoS goals. The IAP would choose prices that maximize its profit
rather than social welfare. Additionally, data objects stay in a cache for at least a few hours, even for one-timer objects that get
purged soon. Hence more elaborate QoS mechanisms, such as those specified in Table 1, can be justified. Additionally, this also
allows for object level pricing. Finally, the resource allocation issues are quite different too. In transmission, the routers queue
management and scheduling operations provide the performance differentiation as opposed to space allocation in caching. All
of these aspects make cache QoS pricing and resource allocation a unique and challenging problem.
4 TRACE ANALYSIS
Before we proceed to the analytic model, we start with an empirical analysis of Web traces in order to calibrate some of the
parameters for the model. Trace data typically records requests for Web pages made by end users and hence reflects the demand
for content. The Boeing trace (2002) consists of 4,292,154 requests over one day. The DEC trace (2002) has 7,866,111 requests.
Distribution of Demand: We denote the fractional demand for an object by R. That is, if four out of every 10 requests are for
object o1, then it has a fractional demand, R = 0.4. Note that R varies with time for a given object and hence is determined by a
stochastic process. We assume that such a process is stable in that it has pdf associated with it. We study traces to determine f(R),
the probability density function (pdf) of R. f(R) may intuitively be considered as a measure of the number of objects with fractional
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demand equal to R. The distribution is modeled as  where R lies in [c1, c2]. The Maximum likelihood estimates of theβR
cRf =)(
parameters are in Table 2. Goodness of fit tests indicate that the fit for both of the traces is good.
Table 2.  Estimates of Parameters for the Distribution of R
Trace c $ c1 c2
Boeing 2.08996E-04 1.51146 2.33E-07 0.002674
DEC 1.27382E-03 1.35583 1.27E-07 0.010715




Cache Hit Rates:  Hit Rate, H(S), denotes the fraction of requests answered by a cache of size S. Clearly, a larger cache has a
higher hit rate because it can store a larger number of data objects. We used a cache simulator to simulate cache performance for
requests in the two traces. We find that the logarithmic specification, , fits well for both traces (see Table 3).)ln(.)( SkSH s=
The results are consistent with earlier literature such as (Breslau et al. 1999).
Table 3.  Estimates for )ln(.)( SkSH s=
Trace Estimate (ks) Standard Error Pr > |t| R-Square
Boeing 0.05004 0.00003063 <.0001 0.9367
DEC 0.04523 0.00002860 <.0001 0.9076
Object Specific Hit Rate:  We also seek the functional form of the object specific hit rate, H(S,R), the hit rate of an object with
fractional demand R in a cache of size S. This denotes the fraction of requests for a specific object that were satisfied by the cache.
Intuitively, the hit rate denotes the probability of a hit for a random request whereas the object specific hit rate denotes the
probability of a hit given the object that is requested. While the IAP cares about the overall hit rate, the content provider is only
concerned about the object specific hit rates for her objects. We model the object specific hit rate as follows:
, where 8 denotes the total number of requests.  We find that this specification also fits well with)ln().ln(.),( RSkRSH λ=
the data (see Table 4). 
Table 4.  Estimates for )ln().ln(.),( RSkRSH λ=
Trace Estimate (k) Standard Error Pr > |t| R-Square
Boeing 0.02296 0.00002463 <.0001 0.828
DEC 0.02271 0.00002672 <.0001 0.740
5 OPTIMAL PRICING
We assume that the content provider/publisher makes the caching decision by data object. This reflects the real world situation
very well. For example, publishers such as CNN decide which objects are stored and delivered from Akamais server and which
are delivered from their own servers. Further, valuations for different data objects may be different, even for the same publisher.
We also assume that the IAP uses a usage based pricing policy as that is the norm in the caching industry today.
Hosanagar et al./Pricing & Capacity Allocation in Caching Services
486 2002  Twenty-Third International Conference on Information Systems
5.1 Content Providers Decision Problem
The content provider has content (data objects) that is requested by an end user. The IAP is a conduit through which the content
is delivered. Due to its unique position in content delivery, the IAP can provide the publisher with additional value through
caching. We separate the value derived by the publisher from the caching service into two components:  hit rate based benefit and
non-hit rate based benefit. The former represents benefits directly associated with caching (such as bandwidth savings and faster
content delivery). These benefits are derived every time an object is served from the cache (called a hit). The latter represents
benefit from value-added features such as support for caching dynamic content, security, etc. 
The quality of the value-added features is denoted by q , U. We denote the benefit to the publisher from the non-hit rate based
quality for an object by 2.q.  2 is a type parameter that denotes the weight that the publisher attaches to non-hit rate quality for
the specific object. We shall also refer to an object associated with weight 2  as an object of type 2. This weight would clearly
vary from object to object, even for a given publisher. For example, a data object containing confidential information may be
associated with a high 2 whereas another not requiring security, reporting, support for dynamic data caching, etc. may correspond
to an extremely low 2. We assume that 2 is uniformly distributed in [0,1]. We find that the general nature of the results do not
change for several other well-known distributions.
The publisher additionally derives a benefit from being able to deliver his content faster to the consumers of his content. This
benefit captures reduced churn from faster delivery of content. For every object delivered from the cache, 0 represents the
aforementioned benefit to the publisher. Another important component of the benefit from the service is the bandwidth savings
realized by the publisher. B denotes the average bandwidth cost for processing one object request (and hence the benefit to the
publisher from caching an object). A piecewise separable benefit function is used, U = 2.q + (Thc).0 + (Thc).B, where Thc is the
count of the number of objects served from the cache. If 8  is the arrival rate of requests and R the fractional demand for an object,
then 8R is the number of requests for that object in a unit time period. If  H (S, R) denotes the object specific hit rate, then
Thc = 8RH(S, R).
Note that demand is driven by user requests and, therefore, the publisher has no direct control over it. Further, users typically
subscribe to particular IAPs and cannot switch IAPs instantaneously. Therefore, the IAP has monopolistic power over the
publishers access to users. This arises from it being the only conduit to any particular end user. A different IAP can only provide
access to a different set of users. Furthermore, IAPs such as AOL have considerable market share which enables them to provide
significant value to publishers that is hard to replace. We therefore consider a monopoly pricing model.
We assume that the IAP offers two services:   a best effort service and a premium service. The best effort service provides lower
quality service and is ideally suited for publishers with lower valuation for value-added features like business intelligence,
security, etc. The IAP charges price PL  for every object served from its best effort cache. In addition, it offers a service at a higher
quality level and charges a per object price PH  for the same. The higher quality is achieved by supporting dynamic content, object
consistency, reporting, etc. and provisioning a larger fraction of the cache for premium objects. The publisher chooses the service
that provides her with the maximum surplus. 
We denote the higher quality and lower non-hit qualities by qH, qL respectively. Thus, the publishers net surplus from the two
services is given by:
(1)( ) ),(..),(... RSHRPBRSHRqU LLLLL ληλθ −++=
( ) ),(...),(... RSHRPBRSHRqU HHHHH ληλθ −++=
where SL  and SH = (1 - ")S.
The cache space, S, is divided into two levels:  the lower one of size "S  for the best effort subscribers and the higher one of size
(1- ")S for the premium publishers. To determine the number of subscribers to the service, we consider a publisher of an object
with type 2L who is indifferent between paying for the low quality service and not subscribing to the service at all (gets zero
surplus from the best effort service) and the publisher of an object with type 2H who is indifferent between the two services (gets
equal surplus from the two services). Any publisher with 2L < 2 < 2H  will choose the best-effort service and a publisher with
2 > 2H  will subscribe to the premium service. Objects of type 2 < 2L do not subscribe to either service. By equating the surplus
from the lower quality service to 0, we get 2L  and by equating the surplus from the two services, we get 2H . 
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Both 2L  and 2H vary with demand R and are thus curves that represent indifferent content publishers. We call these the quality
indifference curves (QIC) for the publishers. These are the indifference points for consumers used in microeconomic models
except that in our case, they are a function of the fractional demand R. A sample QIC, based on assumed prices and quality levels
is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3.  Sample Indifference Curves (for Assumed Price and Quality Levels)
5.2 IAPs Decision Problem
To compute the IAPs profit function, we first determine the expected number of requests for objects in the premium service by
summing up the number of requests for all objects with 2 > 2H (see Figure 3). This is denoted by RH. Similarly, the expected
number of requests for best-effort objects, RL, is obtained by summing up requests for objects of type 2 , [2L, 2H]. The IAPs
expected profit is given by:
 )(])[(])[( HIAPLLLIAPHHH qCBPSHRBPSHR −+++=π
Out of the RH requests for premium objects, a fraction RHH(SH) are delivered from cache and, similarly, RLH(SL) are the number
of objects delivered from cache for the best-effort service. For each object served from the cache, the IAP has bandwidth savings,
BIAP. The IAP charges the publisher a per-object price PL or PH depending on the service that the object is subscribed to. It is
expensive for the IAP to provision value added services. The cost to the IAP is C(qH). Substituting all of the variables into the
profit function and integrating, we get the following expression for the IAPs profit function:
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The term denoted X is the number of requests for objects in the premium service. Y denotes the hit rate for the same and Z the
sum of price charged and bandwidth savings per object (profit per object). Similarly, D is the number of requests for objects in
the best-effort service, E the associated hit rate, and F the profit per object. The IAPs decision problem is: .),(max, LHPP PPLH
π
The optimal prices are computed from the first order conditions. 























































































The prices charged vary linearly with the quality offered. The IAP charges the content publisher a part of her surplus from
bandwidth reduction and faster content delivery (0 + B) and gives back to the publisher a part of its own surplus from bandwidth
cost reduction (BIAP). If the IAPs bandwidth costs start to dominate, then the discount can be substantial. The IAP may even find
it optimal to provision the best effort service for free if the IAPs bandwidth costs are high enough and the quality of the best effort
service is low enough. This makes intuitive sense considering that the best effort service is currently provisioned at zero cost to
the publishers. The following propositions follow directly from the expressions for 2L and 2H
Proposition 1:  If the quality of the best effort service is increased, subscription to the best effort service decreases and to the
premium service increases.
Proposition 2:  If the quality of the premium service is increased, subscription to the best effort service increases and to the
premium service decreases.
Propositions 1 and 2 seem counterintuitive at first glance. One would expect the impact of modifying either qL or qH to be in the
opposite direction. However, an increase in (qH  qL) differentiates the services sufficiently to enable the IAP to charge even more
for the premium service. Objects with high 2  would still continue with the premium service (but pay more) but those objects
located close to the indifference points would rather just switch to the best effort service than pay the steep price for the premium
service. In contrast, a decrease in (qH  qL)  prevents the IAP from being able to charge a premium on the high quality service.
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Since the price is low, a larger fraction of the publishers subscribe to the premium service. This causes subscriptions to change
as indicated in the propositions.
Proposition 3:  As bandwidth costs decrease, subscription to both the services decreases.
6 SPACE ALLOCATION
In the previous section, we looked at the pricing problem assuming that the cache sizes SL = "S  and SH = (1  ")S were
exogenously decided. Space allocation is, however, a real-world problem faced by cache operators. Typically caches sizes are
optimized based on traffic profiles and never over-provisioned. This is because the gains from increasing cache sizes increase
at a decreasing rate and costs dominate beyond the optimal cache size (Kelly and Reeves 2000). The cost of incremental upgrades
at various caching nodes tends to be high, hence they are rarely resized unless the traffic profile changes substantially (Maggs
2002). Thus, caches are a capacitated resource and allocation of the space is an important consideration. The first order conditions
with respect to " do not yield a closed form solution, hence we consider a numerical example to illustrate how the IAP may solve
its allocation problem.
We simulate values for the parameters in the model. We consider an average publisher with bandwidth cost of 0.03c per object
per month. This corresponds to a publisher with a T1 connection priced at $750 per month and an average object of size 50 KB.
The IAPs bandwidth costs would be lower and is assumed to be 0.02c per object per month. The publishers benefit from faster
delivery of content to the end consumer is assumed to be 0 = 0.03c. The publisher who is most sensitive to non-hit rate attributes
such as security, consistency, reporting, etc. (2 = 1) values these features an order of magnitude more than the bandwidth savings
(qH = 0.3).  Finally, qL is set artifically low at 0.001.  The cache size is assumed to be 5 GB.  All of the remaining  parameters are
derived from the Boeing trace. For these settings, we found that the IAP would find it optimal to allocate 16.8 percent ("* = 0.168)
of the cache space to the lower level cache. 
An interesting question relates to the impact of recent trends in decreasing bandwidth costs on the allocation decision. We repeat
the simulations but halve the bandwidth costs for both the IAP and the content publisher (B = 0.15 and BIAP = 0.1). Under the new
settings, it is optimal for the IAP to allocate 11.4 percent of the cache to the lower level. Figure 4 lays out the impact of lowering
bandwidth costs on "*. BBC represents the base case of B = 0.3 and BIAP = 0.2. In each successive simulation, we halve the
bandwidth costs from the previous simulation. We observe that the IAP finds it optimal to reduce the size of the best effort cache
and increase the size of the premium cache as bandwidth costs decrease. 
Figure 4.  Impact of Decreasing Bandwith Costs on Optimal Allocation
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7 CONCLUSIONS
QoS is the leading performance consideration in e-business today. We introduce a framework to structure and analyze the QoS
issues in Web caching in an integrated manner. If designed prudently, QoS caching would move content delivery almost entirely
to the edge. This could change the structure of the digital supply chain and have significant impact on e-business infrastructure.
For example, it could move intelligent processing of collateral information, of interest to e-marketing, to the edge of the network
as well. When combined with our conceptual view of content delivery as a digital supply chain, this suggests that content
providers would gradually become manufacturers of content and caches would handle the storage and retailing of content. This
is a significant reinvention of content delivery as it exists today. 
Our study provides insights into design of incentive-compatible caching services in general, and the pricing of these services and
capacity allocation in particular. Aligning the incentives of the players is a key requirement. Despite the fact that publishers clearly
receive benefits from caching, currently an appropriate payment scheme does not exist. This has partly been due to the best-effort
nature of Web caching. In addition, publishers have requirements that are currently not fulfilled by the IAP such as provisioning
business intelligence, content personalization, etc. This in turn has been due to the lack of appropriate payment schemes. We have
outlined a mechanism to correct both these deficiencies. The framework also has natural extensions to the CDN market, which
is being explored. No previous research exists in the area of cache QoS pricing and capacity allocation.
We find that value-added services would allow cache operators to charge significantly higher prices and thus price discriminate
effectively. If the IAP increases the quality, it can charge more but the subscription to the premium service decreases.
Furthermore, it also has to consider the cost of provisioning these value-added services and be strategic about its choice of the
level of the premium service quality. Additionally, we find that the market share in both of  the services would drop with falling
bandwidth costs. This further underscores the need to provision value-added services. Our analysis has shown that best effort
services will play a diminishing role with decreasing bandwidth costs. Resources may be directed toward serving the maximum
number of data objects from the premium cache (in the limit, this suggests that edge delivery of entire sites would be the norm).
This is an indication of the impending metamorphosis of the content delivery value chain. 
We have assumed that all objects have the same size but find that the general nature of the results do not change even if size is
accounted for (although the quality indifference curves become three dimensional). In addition, an object with high demand may
also have a higher valuation for quality. It is an empirical exercise to determine the correlation between quality valuation and
demand. Future work includes studying the impact of alternative pricing schemes (usage-based versus fixed fee) and extending
the framework to CDNs.
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